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T HE B ATTLE O VER C LASS A CTION : S ECOND C IRCUIT H OLDS T HAT
C LASS A CTION WAIVER FOR A NTITRUST A CTIONS U NENFORCEABLE
U NDER THE F EDERAL A RBITRATION A CT
Dustin Morgan *

I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re American Express Merchants Litigation, the Second Circuit held that the class
action waiver clause within the arbitration agreement between American Express and
corporations found in both New York and California made the agreement unenforceable because
recourse to class action was essential to protecting the corporations’ statutory rights under the
federal antitrust statues.1 The court also decided that under the Supreme Court’s decision in StoltNielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the court, not the arbitrator, continued to be
responsible for determining the validity of a class action waiver in an agreement to arbitrate.2 The
court reasoned that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement would disincentivize
plaintiffs from bringing individual suit under the federal antitrust statutes because of the high
costs associated with antitrust litigation and the marginal recovery that each individual plaintiff
would receive if successful. 3 Because the court viewed the private enforcement of the antitrust
laws as essential to the underlying congressional intent, any attempt to limit this intent would go
against public policy, and would be void as such. 4 By disincentivizing private enforcement, the
class action waiver in the arbitration provision prevented plaintiffs from enforcing their rights
under federal antitrust statutes, voiding the agreement as against public policy. 5

II.

BACKGROUND

The named Plaintiffs in this litigation, California and New York corporations that operate
businesses who have accounts with American Express and the National Supermarkets
Association, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”), “a voluntary membership-based trade association that represents
the interests of independently owned supermarkets,” 6 sought to represent a class of litigants
against American Express, challenging the terms and conditions they were forced to accept by
opening a charge account with the Defendant financing company as a violation of the federal
antitrust statutes. 7 The class the Plaintiffs sought to certify was defined as: “[A]ll merchants that
have accepted American Express charge cards (including the American Express corporate card),
*
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and have thus been forced to agree to accept American Express credit and debit cards, during the
longest period of time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations . . . throughout the United
States . . ..” 8
In order to receive a charge or debit card from American Express, the parties had to agree
to a standard form agreement supplied by American Express. 9 Impliedly, the plaintiffs agreed to
these terms by opening an account with American Express. The standard form contract contained
provisions allowing either party to terminate the agreement and reserving with American Express
the right to change the agreement upon written notice to the contracting parties. 10 The contracting
parties were advised of their right to terminate the agreement within the provision allowing for
modification of the standard form. 11 In 1999, American Express exercised its right of
modification and inserted an arbitration agreement which stated:
For the purpose of this Agreement, Claim means any assertion of a
right, dispute or controversy between you and us arising from or
relating to this Agreement and/or the relationship resulting from this
Agreement. Claim includes claims of every kind and nature including,
but not limited to, initial claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and thirdparty claims and claims based upon contract, tort, intentional tort,
statutes, regulations, common law and equity. We shall not elect to use
arbitration under this arbitration provision for any individual Claim that
you properly file and pursue in a small claims court of your state or
municipality so long as the Claim is pending only in that court. 12

The arbitration agreement also contained the following provision which forbade both
American Express and the contracting parties from participating, either in a representative or
participatory fashion, in class action lawsuits.13 The provision specifically stated:
IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT
TO A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT
TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY
TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM . . . FURTHER, YOU WILL NOT HAVE
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITY OR AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS
PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION.
THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND
BINDING. NOTE THAT OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU WOULD
HAVE IF YOU WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE
AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. 14

In the district court proceeding, American Express moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to the standard for agreement signed by the Plaintiffs. 15 The district court granted American
8
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Express’ motion. 16 In so doing, the district court held that “the agreement was ‘a paradigmatically
broad clause’ which was certainly applicable to the dispute between the parties.” 17 The district
court, justifying its ultimate conclusion, also held that “[t]he enforceability of the of the collective
action waivers is a claim for the arbitrator to resolve. Issues relating to the enforceability of the
contract and its specific provisions are for the arbitrator, once arbitrability has been
established.” 18 Given these findings, the district court decided that the Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims
and the enforceability of the class action waiver were to be settled in arbitration; the district court
dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims. 19
The Second Circuit received the case for the first time after the Plaintiffs filed an
appeal. 20 The court decided that the validity of the class action waiver was a question for the
court, and not the arbitrator, to decide.21 The court reasoned that Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph controlled their analysis regarding the enforceability of the class action waiver.22 The
Supreme Court in Green Tree found that “where . . . a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration
agreement on the grounds that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” 23 Applying this principle, the Second
Circuit found that the district court erred in ruling the Plaintiffs failed to carry this burden because
they “ignore[d] the statutory protections provided by the Clayton Act.”24 The Second Circuit
found that the record supported a finding that the Plaintiffs would incur prohibitive costs if they
were compelled to arbitrate under the agreement. 25 Given these findings, the court held that the
class action waiver invalidated the arbitration agreement. 26 Their decision was grounded in
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), allowing for non-enforcement of arbitration
agreements where a ground for invalidation of a contract exists at common law; since the court
believed such a ground existed here, non-enforcement was proper. 27 American Express filed a
petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court. 28 The Supreme Court granted the
petition, vacated the Second Circuit’s decision, and remanded the decision for proceedings
consistent with its recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. 29
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III.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

A. The Effects of Stolt-Nielsen on the Class Action Waiver
The Second Circuit first discussed the effects that Stolt-Nielsen had on the case, as was
required by the Supreme Court when it remanded the case. The court concluded that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen was that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so.” 30 American Express urged that the Supreme Court’s decision required the court to “faithfully
enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement.”31 The Second Circuit distinguished the question here
as one of whether a class action waiver is enforceable when it would “effectively strip the
plaintiffs of their ability to prosecute alleged antitrust violations.”32 As such, the question was not
one of giving intent to the parties’ agreements; instead, the Second Circuit viewed the issue as
whether Section 2 of the FAA allowed for non-enforcement through common law contract
grounds. 33 In doing so, the court would examine the enforceability of class action waivers under
the federal substantive arbitration law.34
The court’s analysis of the federal arbitration law governing this issue was influenced by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 35 In Gilmer, the
Supreme Court held that “‘[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement,’” the arbitration clause was enforceable “‘unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.’” 36
The Second Circuit, referencing Gilmer, framed the relevant inquiry as “whether the mandatory
class action waiver in the Card Acceptance Agreement is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are
able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement of the waiver would be to preclude
their bringing Sherman Act claims against Amex in either an individual or collective capacity.” 37
The court also examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.Alabama v. Randolph in framing its analysis.38 In Green Tree the Supreme Court held that “when
'a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such
costs.’” 39 This decision, along with the one articulated by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., holding that “public policy concerns might bar an
agreement to arbitrate,” 40 would allow for the Second Circuit to invalidate the agreement to
arbitrate if the class action waiver would force parties to participate in an arbitral procedure that
was prohibitive expensive or would violate public policy. 41
30
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B.

The Court’s Analysis of the Particular Agreement Between American Express
and the Plaintiffs

The Second Circuit began its analysis of the validity of American Express’ arbitration
clause by noting “an agreement which in practice acts as a waiver of future liability under the
federal antitrust statutes is void as a matter of public policy.” 42 The second of the factors
articulated by the Second Circuit was met; the class action waiver was in violation of public
policy. The court next turned to the issue of whether the arbitration agreement would inflict
prohibitive costs upon the Plaintiffs, effectively robbing them of their ability to protect their
rights under the federal antitrust statutes.43
The court here found that there was ample evidence in the record to support a finding that
arbitrating their disputes would effectively act as a bar to the Plaintiffs asserting their statutory
rights under the federal antitrust statutes.44 The court based their assertion on expert testimony
submitted by the Plaintiffs at the district court level.45 The Plaintiffs’ expert asserted that the
Plaintiffs expected awards would be notably less than the expected costs they would incur if
forced to individually arbitrate their antitrust claims. 46 The court viewed the expert’s testimony as
demonstrative that “the only economically feasible means for enforcing their [the Plaintiffs’]
statutory rights is via class action.” 47 Even with the trebling of damages and the shifting of
attorney’s fees, which must include an assessment of likelihood on the merits, the Plaintiffs
would not be able to recover more than the costs associated with the experts and would be
discouraged from bringing suit. 48
The court concluded that the private enforcement of the antitrust statutes was essential to
protecting the statutory rights protected by the antitrust statutes.49 Strong private incentives were
included within the statutes to encourage private enforcement; the prohibitive costs associated
with individual arbitration cut inapposite to these incentives and could not stand when taking into
account this congressional intent.50 Because the class action waiver was found to be both in
violation of public policy and a strong congressional intent favoring private enforcement, the
class action waiver provision was ruled to be void. 51 The court refused to articulate a per se rule
forbidding the inclusion of a class action in an agreement to arbitrate; instead the ruling court
must rule on the enforceability of the waiver on a case-by-case basis, considering the merits.52
Finally, the court did not view the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen as prohibiting this
result; it noted that this decision merely prevented the court from ordering class-wide
arbitration. 53 Because the court did not do this, it was clearly within the scope of its powers in
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making its ruling. The court remanded the decision to the district court for proceedings consistent
with their decision here.54

C. The Court’s Analysis in Light of AT&T Mobility – Amex III
The Supreme Court severely called the Second Circuits analysis when it rendered its
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 55 The Second Circuit addressed this concern in
the third iteration of In re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex III”). 56 The court
found that neither AT&T Mobility, nor Stolt-Nielsen affected its previous analysis.57 It argued that
neither decision addressed the narrow issue presented by the Plaintiffs: “whether a class-action
arbitration waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the
practical effect of enforcement would be to preclude their ability to vindicate their federal
statutory rights.” 58 The court reasoned that class action lawsuits are an effective mechanism for
the vindication of statutory rights. 59 Arbitration can also provide an effective mechanism for
litigants to litigate their rights, but this vindication can only come where the agreement to
arbitrate does not act as a de facto waiver of the statutory right; the litigant must be able to
effectively protect their rights in the arbitral forum. 60 The court found that the Plaintiffs had
proven that arbitrating their antitrust claims would be prohibitively expensive and effectively
prevent them from vindicating their rights under the federal antitrust statutes.61 The court relied
heavily on expert testimony opining that seeking individual lawsuits would lead to a negative
value outcome; this testimony was seen as essential proof that any individual suit would be
prohibitively expensive. 62 The court continued to warn that they were not expressing the opinion
that class action waivers are per se unenforceable, instead the court ruled that “each waiver must
be considered on its own merits, based on its own record, and governed with a healthy regard for
the fact that the FAA ‘is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.’" 63 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
deny the Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration under the FAA. 64
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IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

In re American Express Merchants Litigation is one of the rare cases that significantly
impacts numerous aspects of arbitration law. The Second Circuit’s decision not only affects the
status of class action waiver clauses within arbitral agreements, it also touches on arbitrator
autonomy and the arbitrability of antitrust suits. Each of these issues have arguably been settled
by the Supreme Court, but the Second Circuit’s decision here strongly calls into question this
assertion. While the Second Circuit agrees with the Supreme Court regarding arbitrator
autonomy, its ruling regarding the arbitrability of antitrust suits is seemingly in direct opposition
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 65
The court’s ultimate holding, that the class action waiver included by American Express voids the
agreement to arbitrate, is also now called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 66 All three of these issues present interesting questions concerning
the continued validity of the Second Circuit’s decision in In re American Express Merchants
Litigation, and how courts in this jurisdiction, and maybe even the Supreme Court, resolve these
questions will determine the ultimate impact of the Second Circuit’s decision here.
The Supreme Court effectively limited arbitrator autonomy in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp. Here, the Supreme Court held that the question of whether class
arbitration was appropriate was a question for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide.67 By
overruling the arbitrator’s decision, the Court implicitly reserved the right to determine the nature
of class action provisions within an arbitral agreement.68 In re American Express Merchants
Litigation reinforces this idea. In fact, both parties in the litigation agreed that this matter was a
non-issue; neither party challenged the Second Circuit’s assertion that they were the proper body
to determine the enforceability of the class action waiver in light of Stolt-Nielsen. 69 This decision
is the least contentious matter decided by the Second Circuit, but it is nonetheless significant. It
signals that this jurisdiction has effectively moved with the Supreme Court from a regime that
recognizes a high degree of arbitrator autonomy, evidenced in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle, to one that restricts the arbitrator autonomy, at least within the context of decided
questions regarding class action, as advanced in Stolt-Nielsen. 70 It now falls squarely within the
authority of the court to decide issues regarding class action within the arbitration context; the
Second Circuit directly recognizes this proposition here.
The Second Circuit advances several policy justifications for holding the class action
waiver clause unenforceable; among these the court reasons that the class action waiver provision
places a burden upon individual litigants preventing the kind of private enforcement envisioned in
65
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and fundamental to the antitrust statutes. 71 These findings seem to call into question the
arbitrability of antitrust claims, an issue that was effectively decided by the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 72 The Second Circuit here employs
reasoning that has been explicitly forbidden by the Supreme Court; questions of antitrust
arbitrability have been settled, and the controversies are to be sent to arbitration where the parties
have agreed as such. Even though the court cites Mitsubishi to show agreement with their
ultimate conclusions, it seems to misunderstand the proper application of the precedent; it must
be viewed in terms of its ultimate conclusion that antitrust suits are, at their core, arbitrable. The
divergence from Supreme Court precedent severely calls into question any long-term impact that
this decision will have, making any significant impact, at the very least, questionable.
Finally, the Second Circuit’s decision to invalidate the class action waiver presents
interesting questions in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion. In AT&T Mobility the Supreme Court decided that states may not enact class action
waiver laws that stand as an obstacle to the enforcement of arbitration agreements governed by
the FAA. 73 This pronouncement is arguably applicable to the federal courts. The Supreme Court,
in AT&T Mobility, made broad statements in the decision, describing class action waivers as
interfering with the FAA’s mandate requiring arbitration where an underlying agreement is
found. 74 This broad language hints that application will be applied broadly and call into focus all
federal decisions concerning agreements to arbitrate; class action waivers will likely be viewed as
part of the underlying agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. If this analysis holds true, the
Second Circuit’s decision here will likely be viewed as directly conflicting with Supreme Court
precedent. The Second Circuit’s decision here seems to be inapposite to the “liberal policy
favoring arbitration” described by the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility. 75 Because of this the
Second Circuit’s holding’s continued significance and validity is significantly called into
question. The court’s best hope lies in its decision to not adopt a per se rule prohibiting class
action waivers, instead adopting a case-by-case analysis. 76 Whether this decision will ultimately
stand will depend on the course this litigation takes after remand. It is legitimate to wonder
whether the Second Circuit will stand by its decision if given the chance to reverse in light of
AT&T Mobility, or if the court will decide that it was correct and give the Supreme Court another
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chance to rule on the applicability of class action waivers in arbitral clauses.77 This decision will
determine the ultimate significance of In re American Express Merchants Litigation.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit’s decision in In re American Express Merchants Litigation can be
viewed in one of two ways: either as an attempt to expand protection to consumers trying to avoid
recourse to arbitration, or as a direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s authority to shape
arbitration law in the United States. Either way, the decision is unlikely to stand given the recent
decision in AT&T Mobility. Here, the Supreme Court rejected the courts’ role as protector of
consumer rights. The Court stated “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other
than adhesive are long past.” 78 This pronouncement is an implicit pronouncement that should no
longer serve as consumer protection agencies. The realities facing the consumer market dictate
that businesses deal in terms of adhesion. Consumers must face this reality and not look to courts
to invalidate deals they accepted as part of doing business.
The Supreme Court also showed a willingness in AT&T Mobility to overrule the circuit
courts on issues it feels were decided wrongly. AT&T Mobility was decided on appeal from the
Ninth Circuit; the Supreme Court showed no hesitation to overrule the Ninth Circuit when they
felt the circuit decided the class action waiver issue wrongly. 79 If the Second Circuit is
challenging the Supreme Court in holding the class action waiver enforceable, it should expect its
decision to be overruled. If the Second Circuit gets a second chance to rule on the issue after
remand to the district court it should rule in accordance with Supreme Court precedent and
declare the class action waiver enforceable if it wants its decision to stand. This conflict, and the
discrepancy between the Second Circuit’s reasoning regarding the inarbitrability and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mitsubishi, will need to be remedied before In re American Express
Merchants Litigation can have any lasting effect. Inconsistency and failure to abide by precedent
will only frustrate the development of arbitration law by necessitating needless appeal and
clouding issues that once considered to be clear.
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